Causation in Descartes’ Les Météores and Late Renaissance Aristotelian Meteorology by Martin, Craig
 1 1
1 
Craig Martin 
CAUSATION IN DESCARTES’ LES MÉTÉORES AND LATE 
RENAISSANCE ARISTOTELIAN METEOROLOGY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over seventy years ago, Étienne Gilson showed the parallels between Descartes’ Les météores 
and the Coimbrans’ textbook that was based on Aristotle’s Meteorology. The topics treated in 
Descartes’ work follow those found in the frequently-taught Jesuit textbook. They both 
discussed the formation of clouds, rain, rainbows and other lights in the sky, minerals and 
salts, and the cause of winds and earthquakes.1 The similarities do not end at the structure and 
topics treated that Gilson pointed out but extend to large portions of the treatises’ content. To 
be sure, differences appear, but many Aristotelian meteorological concepts are found 
throughout Descartes’ treatise without being changed at all or only in a minor way. Descartes’ 
Les météores was neither revolutionary, nor was it intended to be revolutionary. 
Les météores was first published in 1637 together with the Discours de la méthode, La 
géométrie, and La dioptrique. Some recent studies on Descartes’ physics and the Les météores 
have emphasized the eighth discourse where Descartes explained the rainbow through a 
geometrical analysis of refraction.2 This emphasis has given the appearance that his study on 
meteorology was part of Descartes’ larger goal of applying mathematics to natural philosophy 
as he did in the accompanying La dioptrique. Other studies, however, have emphasized the 
physical aspects of his account on the rainbow and how the deductive method Descartes used 
relies on observation and experience.3 Moreover, while Descartes appeared to be rightfully 
proud of his treatment of the rainbow, it should be kept in mind that this discourse is meant to 
part of natural philosophy, not mixed mathematics, and is much different from the previous 
seven discourses, which rely on descriptive accounts of the movements of corpuscles.4 
Concentrating on the problem of the rainbow distorts the meaning of the entire treatise 
because most of Les météores is not an attempt to ground meteorology on mathematics but 
rather is a discussion of how a wide range of sublunary phenomena might be explained using 
only matter and local motion. 
                                                            
1 Gilson, “Météores cartésiens et météores scolastiques,” pp. 102-137 
2 For example, Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy, pp. 25-28. 
3 Garber, “Descartes and Experiment,” pp. 94-104.  
4 See Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, p. 370.  
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In the first discourse of Les météores, Descartes announced his method for this subject. 
He would explain meteorological phenomena without recourse to substantial forms or real 
qualities, not because he denied their existence tout court, but because they were superfluous. 
He wrote: 
 
Then, know also that in order to keep my peace with the philosophers, I have no desire 
to deny that which they imagine to be in bodies in addition to what I have given, such 
as their substantial forms, their real qualities and the like; but it seems to me that my 
explanations ought to be approved all the more because I shall make them depend on 
fewer things.5 
 
Here Descartes’ unwillingness to reject outright the existence of substantial forms and real 
qualities was likely a matter of delicacy. In a 1642 letter to Regius, Descartes suggested that 
this tactic was meant to illustrate that these concepts were of no use without incurring the 
anger of Regius’ colleagues by directly arguing against their existence.6 Thus Les météores 
played a role in his attempt to eliminate substantial forms from physics.  
This elimination is widely regarded as central to Descartes’ critique of scholastic 
natural philosophy; for example, in Le monde and in the Principia he similarly suggested that 
matter and motion sufficiently account for the natural world.7 Moreover, the reliance on 
matter and motion is a hallmark not only of Descartes’ physics but an identifying feature of 
the new natural philosophies of the seventeenth century. What is not recognized, however, is 
that the removal of substantial forms and final causes was already common in some 
Aristotelian treatises on meteorology. Granted, in Le monde Descartes attempted to root out 
teleology and formal causation in all of physics, while Aristotelians were more likely to 
remove them just from the field of meteorology, leaving these kinds of explanation intact for 
psychology, biology, and other fields. Aristotelian commentaries were diverse; and it cannot 
be assumed that they slavishly followed Aristotle. For example, one contemporary 
commentator on Aristotle, the Jesuit Niccolò Cabeo, used the field of meteorology as 
paradigmatic for all of natural philosophy and thereby eliminated substantial forms from his 
explanations of all natural phenomena except for the human intellect. Understood in this 
                                                            
5 Descartes, Œuvres, vol. VI, p. 239. Translation in Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and 
Meteorology, p. 268. 
6 Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, pp. 491 f..  
7 Principia IV 187, in Descartes, Œuvres, vol. IX, p. 309. On this point and on the possibility that portions of 
Les Météores came from early drafts of Le Monde, see Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, pp. 226 
f.  
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context, Les météores appears less a herald for the new sciences than a treatise that was 
participating in contemporary debates on explanation in meteorology. 
Because of his tendency to deny the existence of influences, assessing Descartes’ 
knowledge of his contemporaries’ work is tricky. Nonetheless, we know that he learned some 
scholastic philosophy at the Jesuit college at La Flèche.8 What impact his studies had on him 
is unclear. In a letter to Mersenne in 1640, three years after the publication of Les météores, 
Descartes requested the names of authors of Jesuit textbooks in philosophy because he could 
only remember those of the Coimbrans, Francisco Toletus, and Antonio Rubio.9 Of those 
three, only the Coimbrans wrote on meteorology. In the same year he praised Eustachius a 
Sancto Paulo’s Summa philosophica, a textbook on the entire range of philosophy including 
meteorology, which he said he had just recently purchased. Descartes’ description of his 
limited memory of earlier readings may very well be true, but nevertheless should not be 
taken as proof of his total ignorance of contemporary Aristotelians in the 1630s. The 
correspondence between Les météores and other Aristotelian meteorological works is 
evidence of at least a minimal amount of familiarity with one or more of these books. 
Furthermore, there is additional evidence that Descartes was familiar with the content 
of other treatises on meteorology, in particular ones that did not rely on formal causation. 
Soon after the publication of the Discours, Libert Froidmont (1587–1653), a professor of 
theology and philosophy at Louvain and author of the well circulated and frequently reprinted 
Libri sex meteorologicorum (1627), criticized Descartes on a number of grounds: his 
philosophy was too close to atomism, had unacceptable implications about the human soul, 
and did not utilize teleology.10 In a lengthy letter to Plempius, Descartes responded to a 
number of Froidmont’s points. With regard to Les météores, Froidmont had written that 
Descartes’ description of the composition of bodies by their parts and shapes was “too gross 
and mechanical”11 and he complained that Descartes “hopes he will explain too many things 
by position and local motion, which cannot be understood without some real qualities.”12 In 
sum, Descartes’ meteorology suffered by its use of only matter and motion, without recourse 
to formal causation. Descartes defended himself not by arguing that “real qualities” were 
unnecessary or superfluous but by contending that his work treated similar problems as other 
                                                            
8 On Descartes and Jesuit instruction at La Flèche, see Rodis-Lewis, “Un élève du collège jésuite de La Flèche: 
René Descartes,” pp. 25-36; Giard, “Sur la compagnie de Jésus et ses collèges vers 1600,” pp. 199-225. 
9 Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, p. 185. For a discussion of this request see: Ariew, Descartes and the Last 
Scholastics, p. 26. 
10 Armogathe argues that Descartes was familiar with observations found in Froidmont’s Meteorologica. See 
Armogathe, “The Rainbow: A Privileged Epistemological Model,” p. 252. 
11 Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, p. 406.  
12 Ibid., p. 408. 
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meteorological tracts had done. He wrote: 
 
But if one should wish to list the problems which I explained only in the 
treatise De meteoris, and compare them with what has been done up until now 
by others on the same subject, in which he [Froidmont] is very versed, I am 
confident that he would not find such a great occasion for condemning my 
somewhat bloated and mechanical philosophy.13 
 
Perhaps he was bluffing about his knowledge of contemporary works on meteorology. 
Nevertheless, in his defense of himself, Descartes maintained that his meteorology addressed 
the questions typical of the state of the field, thereby suggesting he had some idea what the 
state of the field was and that he was aware that others were not using formal and final causes 
as explanations, that they too were “gross and mechanical.”  
What Descartes and Froidmont meant by the word “mechanical” is unclear and it 
seems likely they did not share a similar definition for the word.14 Nevertheless, a comparison 
of Les météores with the Aristotelian meteorological tradition shows that Descartes was to a 
certain degree correct about a number of his Aristotelian contemporaries if we accept that he 
meant “mechanical” to mean a reliance on material causation and a limited application of 
formal and final causation. An analysis of their work suggests that a debate over whether final 
and formal causes should be part of meteorological explanations had already begun before 
Descartes and continued into the middle of the seventeenth century. Aristotelian 
commentators on the meteorology cannot be thought of as a homogenous group of authors; 
rather, their views varied widely. The supposed novelty of eliminating substantial forms from 
meteorology, however, was in fact no novelty at all. Descartes’ meteorological theories 
should not be understood as revolutionary but rather as a continuation of earlier debates. To 
understand why the field of meteorology differed from other parts of natural philosophy it is 
necessary to return to both Aristotle and his commentators. 
 
ARISTOTLE’S METEOROLOGY 
 
                                                            
13 Ibid., p. 430. On this letter and the meaning of the word “mechanical” in Descartes and Froidmont, see 
Gabbey, “What was ‘Mechanical’ about ‘The Mechanical Philosophy’?,” p. 18. The last two lines of the above 
translation are taken from Gabbey. 
14 See Gideon Manning’s article in this volume for a discussion of the exchange between Froidmont and 
Descartes. See Daniel Garber’s contribution for a general discussion of the term “mechanical philosophy” in the 
seventeenth century. 
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The seventeenth-century creators of new philosophies that competed against Aristotelian 
models prided themselves on their dependence on fewer causes. Even though few historians 
now trust the accuracy of claims of the complete independence of the promoters of such novel 
natural philosophies — they contain caricatures rather than portraits of scholastic thought — 
it is still generally accepted that Aristotelian natural philosophy privileged final and formal 
causation over material and efficient causation. This privileging is stated explicitly in the 
Physics, among other places, and is apparent in numerous treatises, such as the biological and 
psychological works.15 For example, sensation and intellection are understood in terms of 
form and as actualities of potentialities; and the parts of living beings are considered with 
respect to their being “for the sake of something.” Nevertheless, despite the overall emphasis 
on forms and ends, Aristotelian works also discussed material and efficient causation; and 
according to Aristotle it is possible to give explanations, perhaps not always complete 
explanations, of large portions of the natural world using just matter and motion. In fact 
Descartes was aware of the significant roles played by material and efficient causation in 
Peripatetic philosophy, as he contended that his use of shape, motion, and size in physics 
corresponded to some of the principles that Aristotle employed.16 
For Aristotle there were limits to teleology just as there were limits to material 
explanations of nature. A detailed explanation of the varying virtues of the causes is found in 
Meteorology IV 12.17 Contemporary scholars, as well as numerous medieval and early 
modern commentators, have considered this chapter as well as the entirety of Meteorology IV 
to be an introduction to biology, a bridge between discussions of the elements, qualities, and 
the formation of homeomerous substances to discussions of the functions that these 
substances have in animate beings.18 Mary Louise Gill understands Meteorology IV 12 as 
delineating to what extent unqualified (haplos) necessity can explain the natural world. Gill 
equates Aristotle’s “unqualified necessity” to a “material necessity [that] is grounded in the 
natures of materials and in general laws of material causation.”19 In Meteorology IV 12, 
Aristotle contended that there exists a hierarchy of substances, starting from the elements at 
the bottom, going to the homeomerous substances such as flesh and bone, to the 
                                                            
15 Physics II 9, 200a32-b3. 
16 Principia IV 200, in Descartes, Œuvres, vol. VIII-1, p. 323.  
17 The authorship of Meteorology IV has been and perhaps still is questioned. I treat the book as authentic. 
There were extremely few doubts expressed on its authenticity before 1915. For a summary and bibliography of 
most germane scholarship on this question see Baffioni, Il IV libro dei “Meteorologica” di Aristotele, pp. 34-44; 
386-392. 
18 Furley, “The Mechanics of Meteorologica IV: A Prolegomenon to Biology”; Gill, “Material Necessity and 
Meteorology IV 12.” 
19 Gill, “Material Necessity and Meteorology IV 12,” pp. 146-147. 
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anhomeomerous substances such as organs, and finally to entire organisms at the top. The 
level of a substance within this hierarchy corresponds to the kind of causation that should be 
used to explain it. Thus, organs are known with respect to final causality, with respect to the 
“for the sake of something” tou heneka, that is, their function within an organism, even 
though they are simultaneously composed of an underlying matter and are the matter, which 
composes the entire organism. The characteristics of the homeomerous bodily parts — the 
flesh, blood, and bone, that is, the matter of these organs — however, can be known through 
what Gill calls material necessity because, “these things come to be by heat and cold and their 
combined motions.”20 The preceding eleven chapters to Meteorology IV discuss this material 
necessity, the motions caused by the hot and the cold. Similarly to Gill, David Furley stresses 
this book’s reliance on matter and motion,21 on “unqualified necessity,” identical to Gill’s 
“material necessity,” as the primary explanation.22  
Even though Meteorology IV 1-11 explores material properties as the result of matter 
and motion, the creation of primarily but not exclusively animate homeomerous substances is 
seen through the prism of teleology. The actions of the hot and cold participate in the process 
of concoction, whereby an unformed substance attains its perfected form, or, in the terms of 
medieval and Renaissance scholars, becomes a perfect mixture. Concoction is a type of 
teleiōsis, and although this book explains how the hot and the cold cause physical 
transmutation, these transmutations are often seen with regard to specific ends. The fact that 
even the “material necessity” of Meteorology IV is subordinate, at least partially, to final 
causes does not mean that there are no limits to Aristotelian teleology. Although Meteorology 
IV explains why and where there are limits to teleology, the three preceding books of the 
Meteorology, the three books that actually treat meteorological themes, are a better place to 
examine Aristotelian natural philosophy that has little recourse to final and formal causes. 
The first three books of the Meteorology discuss changes in the sublunary region, a 
region that, according to Aristotle, is filled with irregular and episodic changes. Sublunary 
change results from the eternal motions of the celestial bodies that drive the transformation 
                                                            
20 390b2-14. 
21 Furley, “The Mechanics of Meteorologica IV.” Gill and Furley are by no means the first to emphasize matter 
and motion in Mete. IV. For example, Federico Pendasio (ca. 1600), a professor of philosophy at Padua and 
Mantua, claimed that the opinion that this book treated primarily matter and motion was widespread. See his 
Lectiones in quartum librum meteorologicorum, f. 1r: “Principium autem hoc statuo quod apud omnes est 
compertissimum, librum hunc, partem esse naturalis philosophiae, tractat enim quae concernunt materiam et 
motum.” 
22 Although Furley refers to Meteorology IV’s “mechanics,” I refrain from this label because Aristotle does not 
use machines or actual mechanisms as models or analogies. Calling this “mechanical” is anachronistic. For this 
precise definition of “mechanical philosophy” in antiquity, see Berryman, “Galen and the Mechanical 
Philosophy,” pp. 235-253. 
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and cyclical motions of the four elements. Aristotle described the proximate cause of 
meteorological phenomena as being two exhalations that move in continual cycles between 
the surface of the earth and the uppermost limit of the terrestrial region. These two exhalations 
are a vaporous exhalation, which is wet and cold, and a smoky exhalation, characterized by 
dryness and heat. The movements of the dual exhalations provide a unity of explanation for 
Aristotle, as they give an account for a wide variety of phenomena, including many 
phenomena that are now considered to be beyond the scope of the atmospheric sciences, such 
as the apparently fiery paths of comets and the flickering light of the Milky Way. 
Additionally, according to Aristotle, an analogous pair of exhalations circulates beneath the 
surface of the earth and explains geological and hydrological phenomena such as volcanoes, 
earthquakes, hot springs, and the features of the sea and rivers. 
As for most of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, the purpose of meteorology is to provide 
causes. Aristotle did not rely on the supernatural to explain extreme examples of weather or 
other catastrophes and his naturalism was not subordinate to the ethical goal of removing fear 
of the Gods, as it was for Epicureans.23 Rather the Meteorology is dedicated to explanations 
via material and efficient causation. The material cause of these atmospheric and subterranean 
changes are the elements and the two exhalations composed of them; the efficient cause is the 
motions of the celestial bodies, in this case the sun and the moon.24 Final and formal causes 
are not part of his explanations for these subjects, because the matter of meteorological 
phenomena is perpetually imperfect, being partial transformations of the elements, as 
numerous medieval and Renaissance commentators noted. Moreover because these partially 
transformed elements are inanimate, as Olympiodorus argued, they do not participate in the 
formation of organs and organism, which have clear purposes and ends.25 Thus it is perhaps 
not surprising that in Theophrastus’ Metaphysics, where he attacks those who proclaim that 
“all things are for the sake of an end and nothing is in vain,” his first counter example is 
meteorological, namely “the incursions and refluxes of the sea, or droughts and humidities, 
and in general, changes, now in this direction and now in that, and ceasings-to-be and 
comings-to-be.”26  
                                                            
23 See Book 6 of Lucretius’ De rerum natura and Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles. 
24 Meteorologica, I 1, 339a20-33, trans. by E. W. Webster, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, p. 555.  
25 On Meteorology I-III as about inanimate homeomerous substances see Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis meteora 
commentaria, p. 273, 20 f. For other discussions of the limits of teleology in Aristotle, see De generatione 
animalium, V 1, 778a29-778b7; De partibus animalium, I 1, 642a2-3. 
26 Theophrastus, Metaphysics, IX 28-29. On the fact that meteorology was a prime example of dysteleology, see 
Vallance, “Theophrastus and the Study of the Intractable: Scientific Method in De lapidibus and De igne,” pp. 28 
f. For the view that Theophrastus’ position on the limits of teleology was common to Aristotle, see Recipi, 
“Limits of Teleology in Theophrastus?,” pp. 182-213; but, for the view that Theophrastus was attacking 
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Granted, some meteorological phenomena are endowed with purpose. Seasonal rains 
ensure the availability of crops; even though climatic and seasonal weather patterns exist,27 
specific rains, snows, earthquakes, and floods are without order or clear purpose. Moreover, 
Aristotle’s meteorology, as nearly all ancient meteorology, emphasized rare and irregular 
phenomena, such as meteors, comets, various fires in the sky, volcanic eruptions, cyclones, 
and so forth. As a result, proper knowledge of these topics is difficult, he wrote: “Of these 
things some puzzle us, while others admit of explanation in some degree.”28 The arguments 
for intractability for the field of meteorology are even more pronounced in Theophrastus’ 
Meteorology, where he provided not one cause but a multitude of possible causes.29 In 
Aristotle’s eyes and those of other ancient Peripatetics, because meteorology was a field 
dedicated to the part of the natural world that lacks clear order, being composed of the 
elements that have been partially but not completely transformed, it was best understood by 
material and efficient causes rather than formal and final ones, which in turn give us only 
probable or hypothetical knowledge when they provide any explanation at all. Because much 
of meteorology is distant and thus difficult to observe our knowledge of it is provisional, or as 
Aristotle wrote in Meteorology I 7, “we consider a satisfactory explanation of phenomena 
inaccessible to observation to have been given when our account of them is free from 
impossibilities.”30 
 
MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE ARISTOTELIAN METEOROLOGY COMMENTARIES 
 
For much of the Middle Ages and Early Modern period, the most common method to discuss 
meteorology was to write a commentary or textbook based on Aristotle’s writings.31 Because 
over 200 commentaries on meteorology were written during this period, I will limit my 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Aristotle, see Lennox, “Theophrastus on the Limits of Teleology,” pp. 143-151. 
27 See Physics II 8, 198b16-21. Whether Aristotle actually endorsed a teleological position in this case has been 
a matter for debate. For a discussion of this issue see Furley, “The Rainfall Example in Physics II.8,” pp. 115-
120. 
28 Meteorologica, I 1, 339a2-3. 
29 Daiber, “The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation,” pp. 166-293, with an English 
trans. of treatise, pp. 261-271. 
30 Meteorologica, I 7, 344a5-7, trans. by E. W. Webster, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, p. 562. 
Cynthia A. Freeland contends that Meteorology I-III relies on abduction rather than dialectics or syllogisms. See 
Freeland, “Scientific Explanation and Empirical Data in Aristotle’s Meteorology,” pp. 67-102. For a discussion 
of the lack of teleology in the Mete. see: Liba Taub, Ancient Meteorology, pp. 80-84. This lack is not always 
recognized, see Meinel, “Les Météores de Froidmont et les Météores de Descartes,” p. 107.  
31 By meteorology, I limit myself to the field that considered the causes of atmospheric and subterranean events 
and do not consider the prognostication of weather via signs. By limiting myself to this field, I am following 
Aristotle’s definition of meteorology, which was understood as such by the large part of practitioners of natural 
philosophy in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle’s definition see Meteorologica, I 1, 338a19-339a5. 
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considerations to those of some of the most famed Renaissance Peripatetic authors, such as 
Agostino Nifo (1469–1538) and Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525); authors of text-books that 
might have been available to a young Descartes, such as the Coimbrans’, Eustachius a Sancto 
Paulo’s, John Poinsot’s, and Daniel Sennert’s; and the more significant works written in the 
years surrounding Descartes’ composition of Les météores, including those of Libert 
Froidmont, Francesco Resta, and Niccolò Cabeo.  
 By the late Middle Ages the field of meteorology in these commentaries and textbooks 
became defined by its dysteleology. Averroes (1126–1198) retained the exhalations in his 
description of the scope of this work; whereby, in his view, the first three books treat the 
accidents of the dual exhalations and the final book homeomers in general.32 Thus the four 
books, following the general schema of Aristotelian intellection, start with accidental 
particulars and end with universal statements. Albertus Magnus (1193–1280) believed that the 
first three books of the Meteorology treated substances that were in state of becoming simple 
mixtures and the final book discussed simple mixtures.33 Thus for him, the Meteorology 
followed the priority implied in the act of becoming and the completion of this act. Later 
medieval scholars, such as Jean Buridan (1300–1358) and Blasius of Parma (ca. 1400) 
contended that the differing scopes of the first three books and the fourth one match the 
change from imperfect mixtures to perfect mixtures.34 It was this view that was to dominate 
throughout the Renaissance and well into the seventeenth century. 
During the Renaissance, the intractability and imperfection of meteorological 
phenomena was a basis for emphasizing the conjectural nature of natural science (scientia). 
Two of the most famed philosophers of the early sixteenth century, Nifo and Pomponazzi, put 
forth this position. Nifo, who was a professor of philosophy in several Italian universities, 
used meteorology and Aristotle’s confession of the inability to understand all causes in order 
to distinguish the natural sciences from the mathematical. He wrote: “It must be said that 
natural science is not a science simpliciter, such as the mathematical sciences are, but is a 
science that explains the why (propter quid). It is the science of finding the causes which can 
be held through a conjectural syllogism that gives the propter quid of the effect.” This account 
of the effect however is not definitive. He supported this position by his use of Aristotle’s 
meteorology, and argued that, “Aristotle in the book of the Meteorology concedes that he does 
                                                            
32 Averroes, In quartum librum meteorologicorum, in Opera, vol. IV, f. 460r. 
33 Albertus Magnus, Liber quartus meteororum, in Opera omnia vol. IV, p. 705. 
34 Buridan, Expositio libri meteororum, f. 103r; Blasius of Parma, Expositio in libros meteorologicorum, ff.1r; 
49r. This view was followed in the sixteeenth century by, among others, Agostino Nifo, Konrad Gesner, 
Francesco de Vieri, Agostino Pallavicini, Joannes Hawenreuter, Jacques Charpentier.  
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not provide the true causes of natural effects, but that which is possible through conjecture.” 35 
For Nifo, knowledge of meteorology is uncertain. 
Nifo’s contemporary and rival Pietro Pomponazzi’s take on the intractability of 
meteorological phenomena led to an even more skeptical view of the nature of natural 
philosophy. According to his view, the idea of a complete science is held only by fools; 
meteorology is proof that we will never be able to have an accurate account of the entire 
natural world. Pomponazzi maligned both religious thinkers who argued that meteorological 
events, disasters in particular, were the result of the will of God, and those “stupid 
philosophers” and “Peripatetics,” the latter being a category in which probably most of his 
contemporaries included him, who want to know everything, and proclaim that all events can 
be traced back to “movement of the heaven.” 36 Moreover he contended that unlike Seneca, 
Aristotle did not believe that earthquakes and winds have final causes.37 For Pomponazzi, 
meteorology is evidence for the absence of determinism and purpose in the universe and for 
the existence of limits for human knowledge. 
 
DESCARTES AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ARISTOTELIAN METEOROLOGY 
 
While a number of medieval and Renaissance scholars tried to follow Aristotle’s intention of 
leaving out final causation from meteorology, not all Early Modern Aristotelians followed this 
position. Throughout the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, 
commentators on the Meteorology and authors of textbooks in natural philosophy and of other 
meteorological tracts became divided over the question if the field of meteorology relied only 
                                                            
35 “Dicendum, scientiam de natura non esse scientiam simpliciter, qualis est scientia mathematica, est tamen 
scientia propter quid: quia inventio causae, quae habetur per syllogismum coniecturalem, est propter quid 
effectus. per haec delentur obiectiones, quae contra haec fieri solent: Prima quidem delentur ex eo, quia non est 
circulus in demonstratione, cum primus processus sit tantum syllogismus, secundus vero demonstratio propter 
quid. deletur etiam Secunda obiectio, quia effectus semper est notior ipsa causa in genere notitiae quia est. 
nunquam enim causa potest esse ita certa quia est, sicut effectus, cuius esse est ad sensum notum. Ipsum vero 
quia est causae, est coniecturale, utrum tale esse coniecturale est notius ipso effectu, in genere notitiae propter 
quid. nam posita inventione causae semper scitur propter quid effectus. unde & Aristo., in libro Meteororum 
concedit se non tradidisse veras causas effectuum naturalium, sed quo erat sibi possibile coniecturabiliter” (Nifo, 
Expositio super octo Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de physico auditu, f. 6v). 
36 “Peripatetici autem et alii stulti Philosophi qui volunt omnia scire, dicunt ex necessitate motus Coeli haec 
evenire” (Pomponazzi, In libros meteororum, f. 167r). 
37 “Quoniam Aristoteles non posuit causam finalem terrae motus, Seneca autem in suis quaestionibus ponit 
finem, quia fiant terrae motus, et ego quia promisivo his in hoc libro dicturum de causa finali omnium effectuum, 
qui in his quatuor libris determinantur, ita etiam observabo. loquamur ergo de fine extrinseco, utrum terraemotus 
habeat utilitatem aliquam pro fine in universo propriam, et sic etiam de ventis; nulla enim res abstracta est in 
mundo quae non conveniat naturae ad aliquid, et propriam habeat utilitatem in universo, et in suo genere sit 
maxima bona: Deus enim secundum Philosophos est auctor optimus et sapientissimus, cum autem universum sit 
opus Dei, oportet ergo quod perfectissime hoc fecerit, ut Plato posuit in Thimeo [sic]” (Pomponazzi, In libros 
meteororum, f. 190v). 
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on material and efficient causes and could be explained through the motion of corpuscles and 
the processes of rarefaction and condensation. On the one hand, some commentators 
continued in the tradition of Nifo and Pomponazzi and explicitly denied that this subject could 
be explained by final and formal causes; and, on the other hand, several scholars introduced 
this field by giving its final and formal causes. 
During the first decades of the seventeenth century, the role of formal and final causes 
distinguished meteorological treatises in much the same way that disputations about the 
location of comets and the division of the cosmos into distinct sublunary and supralunary 
regions did. There is even a partial correspondence between those scholars who did not use 
formal and final causes in meteorology and those who accepted the existence of the 
transmutation of the heavens, even though the two issues are not connected in terms of 
argument (see chart on p. XX). While the debates about causation in the meteorological world 
were neither as heated nor as potentially dangerous as ones regarding the possibility of change 
in the heavens, nevertheless they were divisive and included what might be characterized as 
extreme reformulations of Aristotelian physics, especially that of Niccolò Cabeo (1585–
1650), which eliminated any role for metaphysical entities in the realm of physics.  
 At the start of Les météores Descartes followed the traditional distinction made in 
commentaries on Aristotle’s Meteorology that substances can be classified as perfect or 
imperfect mixtures. Whereas in Aristotle’s work, matter theory is not treated in depth until the 
final book, Descartes began his treatise with an exposition on the subject, making it the 
conceptual foundation for his exposition. He described the traditional elements as being 
composed of small irregular particles that join together, although never perfectly. Smaller 
particles that move more quickly than larger ones fill up any spaces between the pores of 
bodies made up of these larger particles, which move more slowly but have more impetus and 
thus can agitate other particles easily. The motions, combinations, shapes, and positions of 
these particles give rise to the various types of substances as well as their transformations. 
While rejecting traditional explanations of the elements, he retained the more typically 
Aristotelian terminology of vapors and exhalations. For Descartes, vapors are those bodies 
composed of fine material that are present within the pores of terrestrial bodies; exhalations 
are closely related to these vapors but are more regular in their shapes, being composed of 
particles with a shape similar to those which constitute water but are only finer. He likens 
exhalations to “spirits or brandies.” The sun agitates the vapors and exhalations causing their 
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irregular but cyclical motion throughout the atmosphere.38 These vapors and exhalations are a 
constant resource in the Les météores and are the composing matter of winds, clouds, and 
lightning, among other things. 
Nearly all, if not all, early seventeenth-century meteorological treatises employed the 
terms vapor and exhalation to distinguish Aristotle’s two exhalations. Typically vapor was the 
wet and hot exhalation, while exhalatio was hot and dry, as well as being frequently 
characterized as smoky. A number of authors of meteorological treatises, such as the 
Coimbrans, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Francesco Resta, John Poinsot, and Daniel Sennert 
divided the material cause of meteorology into proximate and remote causes: the former being 
the vapor and exhalatio, the latter the elements, or in the case of the Coimbrans just two 
elements, earth and water (see chart on p. XX). While Descartes did not use the term material 
cause and a fortiori did not distinguish between proximate and remote material causes, 
nonetheless there are parallels between his description of matter and those of the Aristotelians. 
In effect the irregular and fine particles correspond to the remote material cause while his 
vapor and exhalation are the proximate ones.  
Moreover, Descartes’ appeal to the sun as the cause of the motion of the vapor and 
exhalations mirrors Aristotelian positions. Granted, Descartes hedged his identification of the 
sun as the mover, by adding the phrase “or some other cause,” and by making an analogy to 
light, which he argued was the result of the motion of fine particles as propelled by luminous 
bodies.39 The Aristotelian textbooks for the most part state that the force and motion of the 
celestial bodies, particularly the sun, are the efficient causes of atmospheric change. 
Eustachius was an exception, as he believed that “Deus Optimus Maximus” is the efficient 
cause.40 Alternatively, the Coimbrans distinguished the instrumental cause of the force and 
motion of the celestial bodies from their heat.41 While Descartes did not employ a “quality” in 
his explanation, the concept of the heat of the sun as efficient cause does appear in Jean-
Baptiste Duhamel’s De meteoris (1660), a work that melded Aristotelian and Cartesian ideas 
with other novel philosophies.42 
While the elaborate taxonomy of causes and explanations that is found in some of 
these texts books (proximate, remote, instrumental, per se, and per accidens) probably 
aggravated a number of thinkers who wished to leave behind Aristotelian philosophy, the 
                                                            
38 Descartes, Œuvres, vol. VI, pp. 239-241. 
39 Ibid., p. 240. 
40 Eustachius, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, p. 155. 
41 Collegium Conimbricenses, In libros meteorologicos, pp. 4 f. 
42 Duhamel, De meteoris et fossilibus, p. 11. 
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work of John Poinsot (also known as John of St. Thomas, 1589–1644) might have given them 
cause to rethink their antagonism. His “Tractatus de meteoris” in his 1634 Cursus 
philosophicus thomisticus begins with the proclamation that he will not apply final and formal 
causes, only material and efficient ones.43 The efficient cause is divided into two: per se, 
which is the power (virtus) of the sun, stars, and celestial bodies that comes in the form of 
heat, and per accidens, which is antiperistasis. Poinsot utilized corpuscular motifs to explain 
how heat acts as an efficient cause. According to Poinsot, vapor is composed of subtle 
aqueous parts. Heat causes evaporation by lifting these subtle parts to the higher regions, 
where they in turn fall, causing precipitation. The dry smoking exhalationes, however, are 
affected by the heat and virtus of the sun and stars, which cause them to rise and eventually 
flame up causing winds, thunder, lightning, and comets. The power of heat acts by thinning 
out (subtilizando) both of the exhalations and by separating (segregando) the more subtle 
parts from the thick ones. After these subtle parts have reached higher levels above the surface 
of the earth they either burst into flames or precipitate depending on whether they are smokey 
or watery.44 Thus meteorological phenomena are caused by the separation and motion of 
small particles without recourse to final or formal causation. 
Against Poinsot, a number of authors of meteorological treatises argued that 
meteorological phenomena could be understood by formal or final causes. The Coimbrans, in 
a lengthy discussion, concluded that the double exhalations do not have new substantial forms 
but retain the forms of the element. Eustachius contended that the formal cause of 
atmospheric change is located in the forms of the elements.45 Libert Froidmont identified the 
substantial form of fire as the formal cause of meteors and maintained that the formal cause of 
wind was the form of the exhalations.46 Francesco Resta divided formal causes into proximate 
and remote in his 1644 Meteorologia. For him, the remote formal cause of rain was the 
substantial form of water and the proximate the form of the drops.47 In most of these treatises, 
once the formal cause was established there are few applications of it in further explanations, 
although it could be used to deduce the secondary properties of the exhalations; vapor has the 
properties of water, exhalatio has those of fire. Nevertheless, the paucity of applications of 
formal causes is justified by a strict reading of Aristotle. Thus, both Poinsot and Sennert, who 
denied that meteorological substances, being imperfect, have their own forma misti, seem 
                                                            
43 Poinsot, Cursus philosophicus thomisticus: Tomus tertius philosophia naturalis, p. 129. 
44 Ibid., pp. 129 f. 
45 Eustachius, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, p. 154. 
46 Froidmont, Libri sex meteorologicorum, p. 41. 
47 Resta, Meteorologia de igneis aereis aqueisque corporibus, p. 795. 
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more than reasonable in their interpretations. In this context, Descartes’ contention that he did 
not utilize formal causes does not seem particularly bold. 
If Aristotelian meteorology without formal causes is easy to imagine, the same can be 
true for final ones. Neither the Coimbrans mentioned them, nor did Sennert. Eustachius, 
however, wrote that the final cause of meteorology was the moderation of the weather, the 
perfection of the universe, and the manifestation of divine power and wisdom.48 Froidmont 
argued that winds were useful to mankind by stopping putrefaction and making the world 
temperate.49 Similarly, Resta contended that winds thin out the air and make the weather more 
temperate.50 Given that much of the subject of meteorology was disaster-provoking weather 
and geological events, others followed Pomponazzi who lambasted those who thought 
everything had a purpose. This line of thought did not have to wait until Voltaire and the 
Lisbon earthquake of 1755. Furthermore, the conviction of those who held that there were 
entelechies for the weather does not appear to be strong. Froidmont, who wrote scholia on 
Seneca’s Naturales quaestiones, a work that attempted to demonstrate the connectedness of 
the world to divinity through a number of meteorological examples, did not press particularly 
hard on this issue in his attack on Les météores. He took issue with the lack of teleology in 
Descartes’ discussions of organisms but not in his polemics against his meteorology.51 
 
CABEO’S METEOROLOGY 
 
Although Descartes contested some aspects of the Aristotelian meteorological tradition and 
Froidmont was unhappy with his work, Gilson and Gaukroger reasonably point to the 
conservative nature of Les météores despite its novel treatment of the rainbow and the 
enumeration of an explicitly corpuscularian position.52 The relative conservativeness of this 
work can be better appreciated by a close examination of Cabeo’s commentary on the 
Meteorology. Cabeo, a Jesuit who lived in Northern Italy, is best known for his Philosophia 
magnetica, a work that attacked Gilbert and posited that corpuscular effluvia cause magnetic 
attraction. His interest in corpuscular philosophy continued in his Commentaria in libros 
meteorologicorum (1646), a four-volume tome to which Cabeo devoted much of the 1630s. 
Although Cabeo was familiar with the work of many proponents of novel natural 
                                                            
48 Eustachius, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, pp. 154 f. 
49 Froidmont, Libri sex meteorologicorum, pp. 196-198. 
50 Resta, Meteorologia de igneis aereis aqueisque corporibus, p. 363. 
51 Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, pp. 402-409.  
52 See supra, p. XX [1]. 
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philosophies, such as Galileo, Tycho Brahe, Paracelsus, and Kepler, he did not refer to the 
works of Descartes and does not appear to have been influenced by his writings.  
The Commentaria is broad in scope and, although it includes a literal exegesis of 
Aristotle’s text and maintained that Aristotle’s writings are the starting place for the study of 
natural philosophy, the treatise went well beyond Aristotle’s words and even the field of 
meteorology. It is in effect a comprehensive study of natural philosophy that delves into 
cosmology and chemistry as well as meteorology. For Cabeo, Aristotle’s Meteorology was the 
ideal vehicle for investigating the natural world because it avoided the metaphysical 
speculation that dominated the rest of Aristotle’s work. Most importantly, he thought that 
physica should avoid substantial forms as an explanation and rely only on truly physical 
causes and understood through the detailed observation of their physical effects, as Aristotle 
had done in the Meteorology.53  
Cabeo separated physica, as he called it, from metaphysics and mathematics, both of 
which he considered speculative.54 For him physica is concerned with the sensible, that is, “all 
of the effects of those things that can be perceived and are actually perceived,” and “the 
sensible causes of all effects, which can be perceived by external sensation,” while “those 
[causes] that cannot be perceived do not pertain to physica.”55 Because Aristotle was too 
occupied with metaphysics, dependence on his writings caused other Peripatetics to ignore 
sensible objects or to analyze nature using metaphysical concepts. Thus many of Aristotle’s 
views were not authoritative because he was “more accustomed to metaphysical speculation, 
than physical observation.” 56 Within the category of metaphysical speculation, he included 
abstractions and indiscriminate applications of logic that reduced things (res) into universal 
categories, differences, and divisions, all three of which he believed to have no physical 
reality. In his view, metaphysical entities are chimerical because they are not material, 
                                                            
53 Cabeo shared his concern over the non-physical nature of substantial forms with other contemporary Jesuits, 
namely Honoré Fabri. See Roux, “La philosophie naturelle d’Honoré Fabri (1607-1688).” 
54 “Supponendum igitur est tres iam communiter ab omnibus distingui scientias totales speculativas 
Methaphysicam, Physicam, & Mathematicam, quae dicuntur scientiae totales,” Cabeo, Commentaria in libros 
meteorologicorum, vol. I, p. 6. 
55 “Omnes ergo illi effectus, qui sensu percipi possunt, & de facto sensu percipiantur horum omnium effectuum 
cognoscendi ratio spectabit ad Physicam, & ex complexione cognitionum harum proprietatum, & effectuum 
integrabitur Physica, quae tota versatur in hoc ut ostendat causas sensibiles omnium effectuum, qui sensu externo 
percipi possunt, & quae sic percipi non possunt non spectabunt ad Physicam,” ibid., vol. I, p. 9. 
56 “Sed etiam hic videtur Aristoteles magis metaphysicis speculationibus assuetus, quam physicis 
observationibus,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 418; Commentaria IV, 79-80: “unde cum Aristoteles physicum agit, omnino 
antiquos sequitur, sed quia iste Philosophus maxime pollebat ingenio metaphysico, & apprime arridebat 
philosophari per metaphysicas abstractiones, reducendo semper res ad universalissimas, & metaphysicas 
rationes, ut constat in tota eius physica; imo & in tota morali, & poetica, & rhetorica ipsa; semper enim res 
deducit ad differentias, divisiones, & metaphysicas abstractiones” (ibid., vol. IV, pp. 79-80); “omnino Aristotel. 
ingenium erat ad subtilitates metaphysicas, & abstractiones: non concrescebat illa subtilitas ingenii, ut 
concrescunt physica,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 351.  
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sensible, or physical.57 Thus he intended to correct the “many Peripatetics occupied in these 
metaphysical subtleties [who] do not read these books [i.e, the Meteorology].”58 Cabeo 
commented on the Meteorology because it allowed him to create a natural philosophy based 
on physical bodies and not metaphysical concepts, while still maintaining allegiance to 
Aristotle.  
Substantial forms were the main target of Cabeo’s attack on metaphysics. The 
common conception of form as essence was mistaken, according to Cabeo; rather, forms are 
real, physical, material entities, namely spirits and vapors that have powers and virtues. He 
realized that this was not the accepted interpretation of Aristotle, as he wrote: “And thus 
perhaps the substantial form is a metaphysical essence and formula according to Aristotle; it is 
not a physical entity.”59 Nevertheless, because of substantial forms’ non-sensible nature 
Cabeo believed they should have no place in natural philosophy. Moreover, he went on to 
reject the twin concepts of form and privation, a foundation of Aristotelian physics, because 
“one of which is nothing, the other which is metaphysical.”60 Instead, Cabeo defined form as 
active matter. He wrote: 
 
This is a form truly physical, this is a vapid and subtle spirit; for it is that, which gives 
determined being to each thing. For a thing is such because it is animated by this kind 
of spirit. From this [spirit], there is an active force, so great and of such kind; and just 
as the diversity of the sublunary objects comes from these diverse spirits, which are 
implanted in them, the diversity of faculties, properties and virtues comes from these. 
This spirit is true act, it is true form, not a metaphysical formula conceived in the 
mind, but a physical principle of a faculty.61 
 
What Aristotle called form, and what some considered metaphysical, is in fact a specific type 
of body that unifies a substance. It is a spirit, a vapor that consists of small particles of matter 
                                                            
57 “sed videant ne physicam reliquant philosophiam, ut chimaeras sectentur metaphysicas,” ibid., vol. I, p. 114; 
“illud est materia, non chimaerica, sed physica,” ibid., vol. III, p. 406. 
58 “Sed istos libros non legunt multi peripatetici occupati in illis subtilitatibus metaphysicis,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 
352. 
59 “& sic fortasse forma substantialis, est essentia & ratio metaphysica apud Arist. Non entitas physica,” ibid., 
vol. IV, p. 80. 
60 “non forma, & privatio, quorum alterum nihil est, alterum quid metaphysicum,” ibid., vol. I, p. 406.  
61 “forma vero physica est ille, spiritus vapidus, & subtilis, ille enim est, qui dat rei unicuique determinatum 
esse. Ideo enim res est talis, quia tali spiritu animatur. Ab isto est vis activa, tanta, & talis; & sicuti diversitas 
harum rerum sublunarium provenit a diversis istis spiritus, qui rebus inditi sunt; ita diversitas facultatum, 
proprietatum, operationum, virtutum, ab iisdem prodit. Hic vero verus actus, haec vera forma, non metaphysica, 
mente concepta ratio, sed physicum principium facultatum,” ibid., vol. III, p. 4.  
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and contains active forces that order the world.62  
Cabeo’s commitment to using only what he thought were physical entities greatly 
altered the traditional way of understanding causes not just for meteorology but for the entire 
natural world; in his account of substantial change, generation and corruption, and the nature 
of mixture both final and formal causes are conspicuously absent. For Aristotle, homeomerous 
substances were mixtures of the four traditional elements. When fully mixed, a new form 
either supervened upon or replaced the forms of the elements. Medieval and Renaissance 
scholastics thought mixtures were perfect, when the form was fully actualized and imperfect 
when only partially.63 Cabeo, however, discussed generation, corruption, and the perfection of 
mixture in terms of the position and motion of three kinds of matter. Generation results when 
particles of spirit become fixed in a medium; destruction occurs when these particles disperse 
or fly away from the grosser particles, causing their binds to dissolve. “This,” wrote Cabeo, 
“is a true physical mixture, and it becomes perfect, when there is a concoction of its wetness, 
by which the spirituous parts are joined with the fixed.”64 Perfection is not the realization of 
their form or end but rather the result of the power of the binding: “All of the perfect 
compositions [perfecta compositio] of sublunary substances are such because their parts are 
joined with a perfect link.” The stronger the link, the more perfect the mixture.65 Thus, the 
teleological principle becomes equivalent to a physical state. On the other hand, the 
corruption of substances comes from the weakening and dissolution of the links, which causes 
the “spirits and subtler parts to separate from the corporeal and the thick and still ones to fall, 
while the subtle ones go up into the air.”66 Neither generation nor corruption truly creates or 
destroys anything; generation and corruption are merely the division and union of parts.67 
In his efforts to remedy the metaphysical tendencies of his Aristotelian predecessors 
and peers, Cabeo argued that physica should be based only on physical principles. These 
                                                            
62 Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, § 439-462. 
63 For Aristotle’s theory of mixture and combination, see: Joachim, “Aristotle’s Conception of Chemical 
Combination,” pp. 72-86. For early modern debates over the distinction of these terms see Lüthy, “An 
Aristotelian Watchdog as Avant-Garde Physicist: Julius Caesar Scaliger.” 
64 “Haec est vera generatio physica, de quae hic Philosophi, quod nimirum partibus fixis; iterum volatiles aliae 
separatae adiungantur, & convenienti humore adglutinentur, & haec vera physica mixtio, & perficitur, ut 
constabit ex infra dicendis, concoctione illius humidi, quo partes spiritosae, cum fixis coniunguntur, & tota 
perfectio,” Cabeo, Commentaria in libros meteorologicorum, vol. IV, p. 84.  
65 “Tota rerum sublunarium perfecta compositio in eo consistit, ut partes sint perfecto vinculo copulatae, & quo 
magis coniunctae fuerint, & minus separabiles, etiam ab efficaciori agente, diceretur certe res magis perfecta, in 
ratione unius, & compositi; istam autem partium compositionem, seu colligationem, dixi iam saepe fieri in 
humido,” ibid., p. 98. 
66 “Dico ergo, ut saepe indicatum est, & non semel etiam fusius explicatum, rem aliquam corrumpi, nihil aliud 
esse, quam ex attentuatione humidi, quasi ex dissolutione vinculi separari spiritus, & partes subtiliores, a 
corporalibus: & crassas, & consistentes concidere, subtiles in auras abire,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 80. 
67 “ut in corruptione nihil deperditur, sed quae erant unita dividuntur; in generatione nihil producitur, sed quae 
erant divisa uniuntur,” ibid. 
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principles largely came from the Meteorology. The spirits and vapors that traditionally 
explained aerial and subterranean change become the model for the entire natural world up to 
but not including the human soul.68 Cabeo made the Meteorology a starting point in order to 
undermine metaphysical accounts of the natural world based on formal and final causes. 
These compositions, the linking, and the dissolution of the bindings of the elements explain 
the diversity of substances. Even though his philosophy used active principles, the place and 
position of elemental bodies were seen as crucial to creating new substances. His adoption of 
physical principles taken from his reading of the Meteorology ensured that substantial forms 
would have no explanatory role in his understandings of physical change, generation, and 
corruption.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While a number of followers of the Aristotelian tradition from antiquity until Cabeo’s time 
understood meteorology as a field that relied on material and efficient causation, Cabeo went 
further and used Aristotle’s Meteorology as a model for all of natural philosophy. Cabeo’s 
interpretation is no more faithful to Aristotle than the Coimbrans’ or Eustachius’ that admits 
some role for substantial forms and final causes in meteorology. Nevertheless, his 
commentary shows that different directions could be pursued in interpreting Aristotle’s 
primary work that does not use final and formal causation. Eustachius inserted God as the 
efficient cause and contended that the weather is the manifestation of divine wisdom. To the 
contrary, Poinsot explicitly denied entry to formal and final causes in his meteorological 
discussions, and Cabeo seized upon the fact that substantial forms are not involved in the 
Meteorology and thus made it the basis for a physica that did not rely on metaphysics. 
Aristotle and many of his followers recognized that formal and final causes were not needed 
for most of meteorology, but both Cabeo and Descartes did not limit themselves to this field. 
Rather, they thought they could use the material and physical principles of meteorology as a 
foundation for explanations of natural phenomena in general. The kinds of explanation 
previously held by meteorology became the model for all of physics. 
 Although it seems unlikely that Descartes and Cabeo influenced each other, their 
approaches demonstrate that in portions of physics, such as meteorology, both Aristotelians 
and their critics were capable of coming to similar conclusions regarding the insignificance of 
substantial forms in natural philosophy. For Cabeo, Aristotle’s Meteorology with its emphasis 
                                                            
68 For his view on the soul, see ibid., vol. IV, p. 82. 
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on material and efficient causation became the basis of all of physics. Descartes’ Les météores 
relied on similar tactics whereby the failure to use formal causation would not provoke anger 
among schoolmen, because the field traditionally utilized this kind of explanation only to a 
limited degree. Therefore meteorology was an ideal topic for Descartes to unfold his physics 
in a non-controversial manner. The innovations of Les météores are not to be found in 
Descartes’ removal of substantial forms and real qualities, but in other areas, such as the use 
of images as a means of visual persuasion.69 
Daniel Garber has argued that while the Discours was attacked, it was not perceived as 
revolutionary by conservative Aristotelians, such as Froidmont.70 It does not appear that 
Descartes perceived it as revolutionary as well; he did not appear to expect anything but 
widespread acceptance of the contents of Les météores among those teaching in Jesuit 
colleges.71 While Descartes suppressed Le monde, Les météores, focused on the inanimate 
terrestrial world, was a less controversial vehicle to present his larger goal of a physics that 
had no recourse to final and formal causes. Furthermore, because the subject matter of 
meteorology did not demand discourses on cosmology, which had proved dangerous to 
Galileo among others, and because a certain camp of Aristotelian natural philosophers — not 
just Cabeo, but Poinsot and Sennert as well — was already in agreement with his exclusive 
reliance on efficient and material causation, Les météores was a less dangerous vehicle than 
Le monde to provide a new model for natural philosophy. 
 
Name and 
Date 
Material Efficient Formal Final Place of 
Comet 
The Coimbrans, 
1608 [1592] 
Proximate: Vapor 
& Exhalatio 
Remote: Earth & 
Water (p. 1) 
Force and motion 
of Celestial bodies 
Instrumental: Heat 
(p. 4-5) 
Does not have 
new substantial 
forms but retain 
forms of 
elements (p. 5) 
No mention Highest region of 
the air 
(p. 28) 
Eustachius a 
Sancto Paulo, O. 
Cist., 1609  
Vapor & Exhalatio 
(p. 154) 
Deus Opt. Max. (p. 
155) 
Forms of the 
Elements (p. 
154) 
Moderation of the 
weather; 
perfection of 
universe; 
manifestation of 
divine power and 
Sublunary 
                                                            
69 Christoph Lüthy, “Where Logical Necessity Becomes Visual Persuasion: Descartes’s Clear and Distinct 
Illustrations,” pp. 101-103; Claus Zittel, Theatrum philosophicum: Descartes und die Rolle ästhetischer Formen 
in der Wissenschaft, pp. 187-230. 
70 Garber, “Descartes, the Aristotelians, and the Revolution that did not Happen in 1637,” pp. 471-486. 
71 Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, p. 455. 
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wisdom (p. 154-
155) 
Libert Froidmont, 
1639 [1627] 
Vapor & exhalatio 
(p. 22)  
The Sun (p.30) Formal Cause 
of Meteors:  
Substantial 
form of fire (p. 
41); Formal 
Cause of wind: 
substantial 
form of vapor 
and exalatio 
Final Cause of 
wind: utility; 
fights disease by 
stopping 
putrefaction; 
makes world 
temperate (p. 196-
198) 
Some are 
sublunary (p. 
116-117) 
Francesco Resta, 
O. M., 1644 
Proximate: Halitus 
(p. 1)  
Sun, Celestial 
Bodies 
Remote formal 
cause of Rain: 
substantial 
form of water 
Proximate: 
Division of 
water into 
drops; form of 
drops. (p. 795) 
Formal cause of 
wind: motion. 
(p. 360) 
Final Cause of 
wind: Thins out 
air, makes weather 
more temperate. 
(p. 363) 
Sublunary (p. 14) 
Daniel Sennert, 
1632 [1618] 
Proximate: Vapor 
& exhalatio 
Remote: Four 
elements (p. 250)  
The sun, 
subterranean heat, 
winds (p. 250) 
Does not have 
forma misti (p. 
251) 
No mention Some comets 
sublunary, some 
supralunary (p. 
256) 
John Poinsot 
(John of St. 
Thomas, O. P.), 
1638 [1634] 
Proximate: Vapor 
& exhalatio 
(p. 129-130) 
Per se: Virtus of 
sun, stars, and 
celestial bodies. 
Per accidens: Heat 
that separates 
small particles 
from large ones. 
(p. 130) 
Do not pertain 
(p. 129) 
Do not pertain (p. 
129) 
Sublunary 
(p. 137) 
Niccolò Cabeo, S. 
J., 1646 
Earth, water, 
exhalations; 
mercury, sulfur, 
salt; wet medium, 
spirits, fixed parts 
Power of heat, 
spirits 
Do not pertain Do not pertain Supralunary 
René Descartes, 
1637 
Vapor, exalatio  Sun  Unnecessary Unknowable  Supralunary 
Jean-Baptiste Du 
Hamel, 1660 
Vapor, exhalatio, 
fumus (p. 2) 
Heat of sun; 
subterranean heat 
Unnecessary No mention Supralunary 
(Astronomia 
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(p. 11) physica, p. 70ff.) 
 
 
